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Abstract 
This paper presents empirical estimates of the effects of a return to devalued drachma on the 
cost-inflation rate in the Greek economy. The results show moderate effects and the potential 
for substantial improvements in the balance of goods and services. 
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1. Introduction 
At the end of 2009, the Greek economy experienced serious internal and external 
imbalances. Large „twin deficits‟ on the budget and current accounts (12% and 10% 
of GDP, respectively, in 2010), high public debt and net international investment 
position ratios (145% (103%) and  – 98% (– 44%) of GDP, respectively, in 2010 
(2000)), negative net national savings (17% of net national disposable income in 
2010, and, with the exception of the year 2001, they were negative in each year of the 
period 2000-2010), high ratios of gross (net) profits to wages (130% (100%) in 2010, 
and the average value of the period 2000-2010 is 149% (118%)) and unemployment 
(12% in 2010 and 18% in August 2011) are the current problems of the economy. The 
exit of Greece from the Eurozone, and the reintroduction of drachma, is viewed by 
some scholars as the catastrophe of the economy and by others as its salvation. It may 
be argued, however, that the „number one‟ problem is the lack of international 
competitiveness, whilst all the other problems constitute epiphenomena ([1], [2]). So, 
the „late-2000s financial crisis‟ was not the „cause‟ but rather the occasion of the 
„Greek crisis‟. 
 Within the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), the division of labour tends to be 
governed by the „law of absolute (and not comparative) advantages‟, since there is (i)  
deactivation of trade (tariff and non-tariff) policies; (ii) a single currency; (iii) free 
movement of money capital; (iv) free movement of labour force; and (v) the so-called 
„Stability and Growth Pact‟ ([3], [4, ch. 9], [5, chs 6 and 20] and [6] to [8]). 
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Consequently, the national economies (and/or the regions of certain national 
economies), which are characterized by a low productivity, will eventually not be able 
to produce any commodity (setting aside the non-tradable commodities) or, in the 
best-case scenario, will produce only certain commodities (i.e. „unskilled labour-
intensive‟ commodities).1 All the available empirical data suggest that this tends to be 
the case for the Greek economy (e.g. [10, chs 2 and 4]). Therefore, under the present 
circumstances, i.e. within the EMU, the contemplation of internal devaluation 
policies, such as reduction in government expenditures and cuts in unit labour costs in 
the private sector, seems to be the only available, although too little too late 
„remedy‟.2 
 The only purpose of this short paper is to present empirical estimates, by 
means of simple dynamic input-output price models, of the effects of a return to 
devalued drachma on: (i) the cost-inflation rate; and (ii) the balance of goods and 
services.
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2. Empirical estimates 
Based on the most recent (2005) Symmetric Input-Output Table (SIOT) of the Greek 
economy (which describes 59 product/industry groups), we have constructed three, 
alternative, simple dynamic price models (see also ([13] to [16, pp. 145-147]). All the 
models have the same structure, which is imposed by the available SIOT (it provides 
no data on fixed capital stocks, non-competitive imports and sectoral employment), 
but they are based on different assumptions about the response of sectoral gross value 
added to currency devaluation (for a critique of this approach, see [17]).
4
 Moreover, 
given that the international competitiveness of the economy has declined by 30% 
                                                             
1 Flassbeck and Spiecker [9, p. 183] note: „Absolute and accumulating advantages of one country or a 
group of countries over a similar country or a country group are unsustainable. A huge gap in 
competitiveness has to be closed, because otherwise the country or region will face a situation where it 
cannot credibly convince its lenders that it will ultimately be able to pay back its debt.‟ (emphasis 
added). 
2 Panico [11, p. 2] indicates that „[t]he data on labor compensation and productivity however suggest 
that the weakness of these countries [Greece, Spain and Portugal] comes from the international 
specialization of their economy, rather than from the „faulty management‟ of the labor market. […] 
This interpretation implies that the loss of competitiveness shown by some EMU economies requires 
structural industrial policies, rather than reductions in labor compensation, to be corrected.‟. 
3 Kalman [12, p. 18] stresses: „It is well to bear in mind also (to rub in some conventional wisdom from 
the system field) that in the economics problem under discussion a simple and reliable answer may be 
expected only if it were true that the effect of exchange-rate change on domestic price level is loosely 
coupled to the rest of the economy. If a phenomenon is loosely coupled then we are in the classical-
science situation area and there is no problem. (Very probably the problem has been solved already.) 
But, on the other hand, if the phenomenon is not loosely coupled, then we have a system-determined 
problem with all its attendant difficulties.‟. 
4 These models have been formed and applied in [18], and the findings were consistent with empirical 
evidence on the rate of cost-inflation in the first year after the last drachma devaluation (by 14%) in 
March 1998 (the estimated values were in the range of 1.16%-1.75% and the „actual‟ one was almost 
1.2%). 
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since 2001 (in accordance with estimates of the Bank of Greece; e.g. [10, ch. 2]), we 
suppose a drachma devaluation of 50%. 
 The application of our models gives the results summarized in Tables 1 and 2 
(for the analytical results, and their evaluation, see [19]). Table 1 is associated with 
the model that gives the highest rates of cost-inflation, and reports (i) the industries 
that exhibit the three largest and the three smallest price increases after the 
devaluation; and (ii) the relevant price evolution (before devaluation, i.e. at the „year 
zero‟, all prices are, by construction, equal to 100 drachmas). 
 
 
Table 1. The post-devaluation largest and smallest price increases 
  
 
 Table 2 is associated with the three models and reports the evolution of the per-
period cost-inflation rate (as measured by the gross value of domestic production). It then 
follows that, for the first year after the devaluation, the international competitiveness 
of the Greek economy (as measured by the real exchange rate) increases between 
37.2% and 42.4%. Finally, since (i) the elasticity of export volume with respect to the 
real exchange rate is in the range of 0.60 to 0.71, whilst the relevant elasticity of 
import volume is in the range of – 0.90 to – 0.92 (in accordance with estimates of the 
IMF and the Bank of Greece; e.g. [20, p. 10]); (ii) for the year 2010, the exports 
(imports) of goods and services are 48.2 (67.7) million Euros; and (iii) the 
international competitiveness increases by, say, 37.2%, it follows that the deficit of 
the balance of goods and services decreases between 89.5% and 99.4%.  
 
Table 2. The per-period cost-inflation rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industries most affected Industries least affected 
 
Year Coke, refined 
petroleum 
products & 
nuclear fuels 
Water 
transport 
services 
Motor vehicles, 
trailers and 
semi-trailers 
Education 
services 
Products of 
forestry, logging 
& related 
services 
Real estate 
services 
1 136.7 122.5 121.5 101.1 100.3 100.7 
2 141.9 130.9 128.3 106.3 103.7 102.8 
3 143.4 134.7 132.0 112.1 108.2 105.8 
4 144.3 137.1 134.7 117.3 112.9 109.1 
5 145.0 138.9 136.7 121.7 117.4 112.6 
Year Model I Model II Model III 
1 5.31% 5.31% 9.29% 
2 1.59% 3.84% 5.96% 
3 0.51% 2.99% 4.27% 
4 0.16% 2.44% 3.26% 
5 0.05% 2.06% 2.58% 
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3. Concluding remarks 
Using simple input-output price models, it has been estimated that a drachma 
devaluation of 50% does not imply, directly or indirectly, great inflationary 
„pressures‟, as is commonly believed, and in fact could directly increase the 
international competitiveness of the economy by about 37% and decrease the deficit 
of the balance of goods and services by about 89%. It need hardly be argued that, 
even if we overlook the limitations of the used framework, these findings per se 
cannot provide support neither to those who argue for the switch to the drachma, nor 
to those who argue against (e.g. [21], [22] and, respectively, [23, pp. 37-40]). 
However, they would seem to be useful for (i) a comparative evaluation of the painful 
process of internal devaluation, which is in progress; and (ii) the case where Greece 
leaves, in one way or another, the Eurozone. Finally, it should be noted that there are 
good theoretical generalizations of the present models ([24] to [27]) that integrate the 
price and quantity sides and, therefore, could offer more reliable estimates, provided 
that the required data are available. 
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